Conceptions of Human Rights by Neil, David A
University of Wollongong
Research Online
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts
2019
Conceptions of Human Rights
David A. Neil
University of Wollongong, dneil@uow.edu.au
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Publication Details
Neil, D. (2019). Conceptions of Human Rights. In J. W. Koterski & G. Oppy (Eds.), Theism and Atheism: Opposing Arguments in
Philosophy (pp. 482-487). Farmington Hills, United States: Macmillan Reference.
Conceptions of Human Rights
Abstract
This chapter considers moral realism, our capacity for moral judgment, the diversity of systems of moral belief,
and the normative force of human rights. It argues that the justification of moral practice, as we ordinarily
understand it, does not require belief in God. Indeed, in some areas of ethical theory, atheism has explanatory
advantages over theism.
Disciplines
Arts and Humanities | Law
Publication Details
Neil, D. (2019). Conceptions of Human Rights. In J. W. Koterski & G. Oppy (Eds.), Theism and Atheism:
Opposing Arguments in Philosophy (pp. 482-487). Farmington Hills, United States: Macmillan Reference.
This book chapter is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/3824
Theists might reply that it would be a weakness in evolutionary theory if it could not explain
why people have a capacity to see with their eyes what is happening on the moon, and why reason
has a capacity to answer moral and mathematical questions that have no evolutionary advantage.
But as long as having that capacity is not disadvantageous, evolutionary theory need not be able
to explain it. Evolutionary theory should be able to explain why gazelles can run faster than lions,
but it would be no mark against it if it could not explain why they are much faster than lions. No
doubt there would be some as yet unknown detailed genetic explanation of their ability to run
much faster that goes beyond any evolutionary explanation. It seems plausible to think that there
is some as yet unknown detailed genetic explanation of the brain’s capacity to grasp objective math-
ematical and moral truths. Even if Scanlon is wrong in thinking that moral truths just are the moral
propositions arrived at when reflective equilibrium is correctly applied, it does seem necessarily true
that we are justified in believing that something is a moral truth when reflective equilibrium is cor-
rectly applied.
Not only can atheists explain how we know, or are justified in believing, objective moral truths,
if it is not reasonable to believe that God exists, then it will not be reasonable to believe that God
created us with a conscience, or even a kind of reason, that allows us to grasp moral truths. If it
is not unreasonable to believe that God exists, it will be hard to explain why there is so much moral
disagreement if God created everyone with the same sort of moral conscience or why he did not cre-
ate everyone with that sort of conscience if he created different people with different moral con-
sciences. Perhaps theists will say that people are born with the same moral conscience, but they have
corrupted it through sin. But such an auxiliary hypothesis needs support if it is to save the view that
God created everyone with the same sort of moral conscience.
Atheists also have to account for moral disagreement. It can partly be explained by partiality:
people often favor themselves and those for whom they care, and this can skew their moral judg-
ments. At the end of Reasons and Persons, Parfit is optimistic about the prospects of moral agree-
ment, saying that moral reasoning, freed from the influence of religion, “is a very recent event”
(1984, 454). He sees religion itself as an obstacle that must be overcome for greater moral agree-
ment to emerge.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, it were a toss-up whether the atheist or theist has the best
explanation of moral disagreement, leaving questions about the existence of God aside. Still, I
believe that arguments against the existence of God, and in particular the argument from evil, would
break the tie. So, all things considered, we should accept the atheistic explanation of our capacity to
know objective moral truths. It is a plausible account that parallels an atheistic account of how we
have a capacity to know objective mathematical truths. Further, it does not require positing the exis-
tence of an immaterial being who somehow implants a moral sense or capacity in people.
CONCEPTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
David Neil, University of Wollongong
So far this chapter has assessed theistic and nontheistic conceptions of ethics with regard to moral
realism, the diversity of moral belief, and the nature of moral judgment. Another approach to com-
parative evaluation is to focus on substantive normative claims that are widely accepted, and to ask
whether theistic or nontheistic approaches can provide the best explanation of those norms. For the
purpose of this discussion, the focus will be on human rights. Is the global ascent of human rights a
secular phenomenon, or does the very idea of human rights require a religious underpinning?
Charles Beitz makes an important distinction between “orthodox” and “practical” conceptions
of human rights. The orthodox conception “is the idea that human rights have an existence in the
moral order that is independent of their expression in international doctrine” (Beitz 2004, 196).
On this view, persons possess human rights simply in virtue of being human, and the instruments
of human rights law, such as international covenants, ultimately draw their authority from this
moral foundation. The practical conception, by contrast, “takes the doctrine and discourse of
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human rights as we find them in international political practice as basic” (Beitz 2004, 197). Human
rights have functional roles in international discourse, and those functions determine both what
human rights are and what human rights there are. The practical conception is not committed to
denying any fundamental moral foundation for international human rights. Rather the practical
approach treats questions about the nature of human rights as separable from questions about the
moral justification of human rights. On this view, human rights advocates could conceivably agree
about the form and content of human rights while disagreeing as to how those rights are grounded
(Beitz 2004, 197).
The practical conception appears to align with the strategy adopted in drafting the 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, such that forty-eight of the then fifty-eight members of the
United Nations were able to ratify it (UN General Assembly 1948). The UDHR contained no
enforcement mechanism, and it was not legally binding. The decades since the UN General Assem-
bly’s adoption of the UDHR have seen no shortage of crimes against humanity, and the world still
lacks effective institutions and procedures that can protect the vulnerable against state-sponsored
violence. Yet the Declaration is undoubtedly one of the most consequential documents of the twen-
tieth century. The prominent human rights lawyer Geoffrey Robertson describes the UDHR as an
“imperishable statement that has inspired more than 200 international treaties, conventions and
declarations, and the bills of rights found in almost every national constitution adopted since the
war” (Robertson 2013, 42).
Along with the Geneva Conventions, the UDHR was drafted in the climate of moral urgency
that followed the Nuremberg trials (1945–1946), in which former Nazi leaders were brought before
the International Military Tribunal on charges of war crimes. Its preamble asserts that “the barbarous
acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind” were the consequence of “disregard and con-
tempt for human rights” and declares “freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want”
as the “highest aspiration of the common people.” Viewed in historical context, the UDHR was not
an assertion of the universal validity of Western values. Rather, in the words of Michael Ignatieff, it
was “a war-weary generation’s reflection on European nihilism and its consequences.” (Ignatieff
2001, 4). Ignatieff describes the UDHR as representing a return to the natural law heritage of Euro-
pean law, intended to promote the agency of citizens to stand up to the orders of an unjust state. The
Nuremberg trials were a pivotal moment in international law because they brought the first indict-
ments of political leaders for crimes against humanity. By asserting that a state’s treatment of its citi-
zens must manifest a basic respect for their human dignity, the trials directly challenged the Westpha-
lian principle of state sovereignty and the international law principle of sovereign immunity. It is
perhaps because the postwar understanding of human rights stresses their function of imposing moral
limits on sovereign power that human rights discourse proved so effective for a broad range of politi-
cal movements in the latter half of the twentieth century. From the 1950s the so-called human rights
revolution (that is, the global deployment of human rights discourse in anticolonial revolutions, labor
struggles, civil rights struggles, and other forms of political activism) transformed human rights into
the primary tool of argumentation for social justice movements (Iriye, Goedde, and Hitchcock 2012).
However, the success of human rights in international politics and law has been achieved by
defining human rights only at the level of practice and abstaining from theoretical commitments
as to their basis and justification. The UDHR was able to be ratified by communist and capitalist
states, by countries with state religions and countries with constitutional separation of church and
state, because the text maintained a strict neutrality with respect to both religion and ideology.
The Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain, who was involved in the drafting of the UDHR, relates
an anecdote: at a meeting of the UNESCO National Commission where human rights were being
discussed, “someone expressed astonishment that certain champions of violently opposed ideologies
had agreed on a list of those rights. ‘Yes,’ they said, ‘we agree about the rights but on condition that
no one asks us why”’ (UNESCO 1948, 1). In his introduction to the UNESCO symposium on
human rights, Maritain further states:
Where it is a question of rational interpretation and justifications of speculation or theory, the
problem of Human Rights involves the whole structure of moral and metaphysical (or anti-
metaphysical) convictions held by each of us. So long as minds are not united in faith or
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philosophy, there will be mutual conflicts between interpretations and justifications. In the
field of practical conclusions, on the other hand, agreement on a joint declaration is possible,
given an approach pragmatic rather than theoretical and cooperation in the comparison,
recasting and fixing of formulae, to make them acceptable to both parties as points of
convergence in practice, however opposed the theoretic viewpoints. (UNESCO 1948, 3)
This conviction about the possibility and value of “convergence in practice” lies at the core of John
Rawls’s approach to human rights in The Law of Peoples. In pluralist societies, neither religious, philo-
sophical, nor moral unity is possible. Therefore, social stability “must be rooted in a reasonable political
conception of right and justice affirmed by an overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines”
(Rawls 1999, 16). For Rawls, human rights belong to a “reasonable political conception of right” pre-
cisely insofar as they do not presuppose any particular theistic, metaphysical, or meta-ethical premises.
These rights do not depend on any particular comprehensive religious doctrine or
philosophical doctrine of human nature. The Law of Peoples does not say, for example,
that human beings are moral persons and have equal worth in the eyes of God; or that they
have certain moral and intellectual powers that entitle them to these rights.… Still, the Law of
Peoples does not deny these doctrines. (Rawls 1999, 68)
One important reason why human rights discourse has been able to acquire the political and legal
authority that it has is that the human rights project has been conceived as a project of formalizing
what Rawls called an “overlapping consensus.” At the level of practice, there is broad agreement
between mainstream theistic and atheistic ethical systems on the importance of human rights as
goals and standards for moral progress in the world.
Yet, despite the pragmatism with which the foundational instruments of human rights protec-
tion were constructed, the UDHR and the key treaties that followed it cannot actually be classed as
“practical” conceptions of human rights in Beitz’s sense. This is because UN-authored human rights
documents allude to an objective moral foundation for human rights, in human dignity. In the
UDHR, a connection between human rights and dignity is implied but unspecified. Subsequently,
in both of the 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights we find the explicit dec-
laration that the human rights they enumerate are derived from human dignity (UN General Assem-
bly 1966). This claim that human rights derive from human dignity has since been reiterated in
other UN declarations (e.g., the 1993 Vienna Declaration), but all official references to human dig-
nity carefully avoid imputing any religious or metaphysical content to that term.
For any orthodox theory of human rights, human rights declarations, treaties, charters, and laws
do not create human rights. Human rights exist prior to and independently of the texts that aim to
define, enact, and protect them. The concept of a human right is a right that one has simply in vir-
tue of being human. Although the UN nowhere defines the meaning of “dignity,” the reference to
human dignity as the source of human rights can only be read as the claim that humanness carries
some innate value or moral worth, from which substantive, deontic norms can be derived.
The most basic theoretical problem for any orthodox theory is explaining why being a member
of the species Homo sapiens is both a necessary and sufficient condition for possessing human rights.
Here we find a crucial difference between theistic and nontheistic accounts. A number of theolo-
gians and religious philosophers have argued that human rights require a religious foundation and
that secular theories of human rights are untenable (see Perry 2006; Küng 1991; Stackhouse
2005; and the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation 1990). Any secular theory that endorses
the uniquely human character of human rights needs to explain the moral significance of human-
ness without appealing to notions of human sacredness or the sanctity of human life. Because a sur-
vey of the key figures on this terrain is well beyond the scope of this section, for the purpose of illus-
tration I briefly contrast just two approaches to this question, one theistic and one nontheistic.
A THEISTIC APPROACH
The Christian philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff asks what the project of trying to ground human
rights in human dignity requires, arguing that no secular ground for human rights is possible (Wol-
terstorff 2008, 319, 323–341). That project demands an explanation of why all and only human
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beings possess a dignity that makes them morally inviolate in just the ways specified by human
rights declarations. Given that any secular grounding of human rights cannot appeal to sacredness
to explain the inviolability of every human, such approaches must identify some capacity humans
possess, which is posited as the source and ground of human dignity.
Kant provides perhaps the most influential capacity-based account of human dignity. For Kant,
personhood arises from the capacity for rationality, through which humans are able to grasp the
moral law and to make the moral law the governing motive of the will. Against Kant, Wolterstorff
contends that rationality cannot be the ground of human dignity because it is not possessed by all
humans (it is lacking in babies and the cognitively impaired, for example). It is a capacity that a
human person can lose without thereby losing his or her moral worth. It is also likely that some
nonhuman animals possess reasoning abilities superior to some humans. Most important, however,
rationality is a spectrum capacity. Some humans have significantly greater rational capacities than
others. Any analysis that reduces dignity to the capacity for reason has the consequence that humans
with greater rational powers also possess greater dignity, and hence greater moral worth, than others.
Wolterstorff claims that an objection of the same form can be extended to any capacity-based
account of human moral worth. For any capacity that might plausibly by identified with human
dignity, not all humans will possess that capacity, even potentially. And given the unequal distribu-
tion of every capacity across the human race, capacity approaches cannot explain why dignity
attaches to humanness and only to humanness in such a way as to confer dignity and moral value
equally on every human being.
In Wolterstorff’s view, a commitment to human rights requires that every member of the spe-
cies homo sapiens is accorded a sacredness that other species do not possess. Human sacredness can
only be grounded theistically, and that ground is found in the biblical doctrine that humans bear
the image of God. The argument proceeds via a lengthy discussion about how the imago dei should
be interpreted, which cannot be summarized here. The crucial claim, however, is that (correctly
interpreted) the imago dei is an essential aspect of human nature, and that God loves “equally and
permanently” (Wolterstorff 2008, 352) every creature that bears the imago dei, thus bestowing all
humans with a special moral worth.
A NONTHEISTIC APPROACH
James Griffin, in his highly influential book On Human Rights (2008), takes on the task that Wolter-
storff declares impossible for secular ethics. Griffin traces the concept of human rights to medieval
theories of natural law, a law that was believed to be manifest in the form of innate, action-guiding,
moral dispositions implanted in humans by God. Natural rights, understood as entitlements a person
has, first appeared as a corollary of natural law. During the Enlightenment the theological content of
natural rights was stripped away, and natural rights came to be understood as accessible through rea-
son alone. The French Revolution’s 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man formalizes both the sec-
ularization of natural rights and their rebranding as human rights. The language of human rights
largely fell out of favor in the nineteenth century, and was emphatically rehabilitated after World
War II. The contemporary understanding of a human right is continuous with the Enlightenment
notion of “a right that we have simply in virtue of being human” (Griffin 2008, 2). However, when
the theological content of natural right was abandoned, “nothing was put in its place” (Griffin 2008,
2): the concept of human rights we have inherited from the Enlightenment is indeterminate. A con-
sequence of this indeterminacy of sense is that arguments about what human rights there are, how
those rights should be understood, and how conflicts of rights should be adjudicated, are undecid-
able. Lacking clear criteria for the application of the concept of a human right, “we often have only
a tenuous, and sometimes a plainly inadequate, grasp on what is at issue” (Griffin 2008, 2).
Griffin’s project is to remedy the indeterminacy of human rights, articulating what they are,
how they are derived, and the role they have in ethical theory. Rather than attempt here to give a
précis of a book-length argument, I will focus on Griffin’s interpretation of dignity in the phrase
“the dignity of the human person” (Griffin 2008, 6). For Griffin, the notion of dignity that is rele-
vant for human rights is profoundly connected with human agency: “Human life is different from
the life of other animals. We human beings have a conception of ourselves and of our past and
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future. We reflect and assess. We form pictures of what a good life would be… And we try to realize
these pictures. This is what we mean by a distinctively human existence” (Griffin 2008, 32).
Griffin variously refers to this essentially human power as “personhood,” “autonomy,” and
“normative agency.” The claim is not that human rights are derived from normative agency. Rather,
the proposal is that defining the basic function of human rights as the protection of normative
agency makes the concept determinate in a way that best preserves its role in ethics. We can see
how the most basic and uncontroversial human rights—the rights to life, liberty, physical security,
freedom of speech, conscience, religion, and association—are all essential for the enjoyment of
meaningful normative agency.
Griffin insists that normative agency is not merely instrumentally valuable. It should be under-
stood as an end in itself. The effort of self-direction makes our lives more meaningful, indepen-
dently of whether our plans and our efforts are successful. Our dignity as human persons, then, con-
sists in our status as autonomous beings, a status that can be destroyed or compromised when our
human rights are violated.
Atheists and theists can agree, to a large extent, on what rights belong on the list of human
rights. However, religious and secular theorists follow very different paths in explaining the basis
of human rights, and each path has distinct advantages and disadvantages. Those who believe in a
loving God have a more straightforward explanation of how it could be that all human beings pos-
sess an innate moral worth to an equal degree. That special form of value is bestowed by God on all
humans and only on humans. Without recourse to the notion of sacredness, secular ethics faces the
challenge of identifying the human capacity or attributes that warrant the protection of human
rights, and that are sufficiently universal to explain the universality of human rights. Griffin’s
account of normative agency is one way. Of course, there are several other theories. Griffin is right,
though, that human rights discourse is vague. This indeterminacy of human rights makes it impos-
sible to give principled answers to practical problems about the scope and boundaries of specific
rights, about their application in hard cases, and about how to resolve conflicts between rights.
Some human rights aim to protect people from violence and oppression. Others aim to guarantee
some minimum level of opportunity to lead a worthwhile life. A theoretical specification of the
rights protections a person needs in order to construct a life that is properly her own must be
informed by a theory of personhood, of what persons need to flourish, and of the ways in which
personhood can be damaged or lost. If we accept that modern human rights doctrine is an outline
plan from which a lot of essential detail is missing, then we should also accept that the resources
of secular ethics are needed to supply the details.
An account of why humans have an innate moral value, which makes each human irreplace-
able, is not the same as an account of what makes a human life valuable to the person whose life
it is. These are distinct kinds of value. Crucially, the second kind of value can be gained or lost,
but not the first kind. For example, a person experiencing unbearable suffering in the final stages
of a terminal illness may rationally judge that life has lost all value and may wish to die. Yet that
person still possesses the first kind of value and rightly commands the respect that follows from
the fact that he or she is still a human being. Indeed, we extend that form of respect to the dead.
Our conception of human rights is answerable to both of these types of moral value. One way to
characterize the difference between theistic and nontheistic theories of human rights is that theistic
accounts tend to treat the first kind of value—the innate value of human life—as both independent
of, and morally more important than, the second kind of value—the value one places on one’s own
life as it is subjectively experienced. Secular accounts largely focus on the second kind of value—on
how life is valued from the inside—and tend to treat the first kind of value as, in some way, derived
from the second. As a generalization, that is, of course, also an oversimplification. This contrast is by
no means offered as an exceptionless taxonomic rule. However, I hope it is a useful way to bring into
focus one fundamental difference between religious and secular theories of human rights.
CHAPTER REVIEW
This chapter examines whether general facts about morality, and the human capacity to make moral
judgments, count in favor of theism or atheism.
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Section A assumes moral realism and argues that God’s will cannot be the source of moral rea-
sons. Divine command theories face the Euthyphro problem: the dilemma of whether God com-
mands right actions because they are right, or whether right actions are right because God com-
mands them. In order to hold that moral reasons are born from God’s will, the theist must
believe that moral obligations do not arise from the natural facts alone. Thibodeau shows that a
divine command account of morality cannot meet this challenge. The price of insisting on a divine
command morality, in which God’s commands are not determined by objective moral properties, is
that such a view renders the connection between normative reasons and moral obligation unintelli-
gible.
Section B considers whether the similarities and differences in the moral codes of different peo-
ples are more readily explained from a theistic or atheistic standpoint. Metz contends that, if an
omnipotent God communicated a single set of moral commands to all human beings, and made
entry to heaven conditional on observance of those commands, it is hard to explain why we do
not find far greater convergence in moral belief than there actually is. Atheism is consistent with
the view that morality developed because it enabled forms of social cooperation that contributed
to human survival and flourishing. If systems of morality evolved separately and in parallel, we
would expect some fundamental similarities, arising from our common biological needs and vulner-
abilities—and we would also expect many differences arising from the divergent developmental
paths of different peoples and their cultures. An account of morality as something that emerges
and develops within the history of human development provides a more plausible explanation of
the plurality of moral systems.
Section C assesses whether atheists can hold that moral judgments are objective and truth-
assessable. A common charge against atheistic ethics is that the practice of moral judgment appears
to presuppose moral objectivism, and moral objectivism, the theist claims, requires a religious foun-
dation. Atheistic ethics, here, refers to any meta-ethical theory in which God does not play an
explanatory role. Russell shows that even views that find ethics in convention, social contract, or
subjective moral dispositions can still make sense of practices of moral reasoning, and can hold that
there are right answers to moral questions. However, there are atheistic ethical theories that compre-
hend morality as objective and mind-independent. These views assert that there are moral truths
than can be known, just as there are knowable scientific truths. So it is not true that atheists must
deny either rationality of moral judgment or the objectivity of moral facts. Russell also points out
that moral epistemology is substantially independent of the metaphysics of morals. Despite their
metaphysical disagreements, theists and atheists can share an epistemology that adequately grounds
their ethical beliefs, irrespective of the truth or falsity of their moral metaphysics.
Section D looks at the rapid embrace of human rights, after World War II, as moving toward
universal acceptance of the moral value of every human individual, and considers whether the idea
of human rights has religious or secular foundations. The political project of achieving international
acceptance of human rights, and of creating enforcement mechanisms in international law, has been
successful because declarations and treaties have largely avoided any meta-ethical claims about the
foundation of human rights. Here also we find that theists and atheists, despite their metaphysical dif-
ferences, can find substantial agreement on the content of human rights. However, the idea of human
rights does appear to presuppose that membership in the human species carries an inherent dignity
that attaches to all human beings and only to human beings. Theists claim that humans can possess
an inherent dignity only if it is bestowed by a loving God. There are, however, compelling atheistic
accounts of human dignity that focus on what constitutes a distinctively human mode of existence.
Neil suggests that the dispute between theistic and atheistic accounts of human rights derives from
fundamental differences concerning the source of human values and the value of humans. A commit-
ment to human rights does not present a risk of self-contradiction for either theists or atheists, but
theists and atheists must construct their theories of human rights from different resources.
This chapter considers moral realism, our capacity for moral judgment, the diversity of systems
of moral belief, and the normative force of human rights. It argues that the justification of moral
practice, as we ordinarily understand it, does not require belief in God. Indeed, in some areas of eth-
ical theory, atheism has explanatory advantages over theism.
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